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Abstract-  In cloud environment the role based access control 
(RBAC) system model has come up with certain promising 
facilities for security communities. This system has established 
itself as highly robust, powerful and generalized framework for 
providing access control for security management. There are 
numerous practical applications and circumstances where the 
users might be prohibited to consider respective roles only at 
certain defined time periods. Additionally, these roles can be 
invoked only on after pre-defined time intervals which depend 
on the permission of certain action or event. In order to 
incarcerate this kind of dynamic aspects of a role, numerous 
models like temporal RBAC (TRBAC) was proposed, then 
while this approach could not deliver anything else except the 
constraints of role enabling. Here in this paper, we have 
proposed robust and an optimum scheme called Dynamic 
expiration enabled role based access control (DEERBAC) 
model which is efficient for expressing a broad range of 
temporal constraints. Specifically, in this approach we permit 
the expressions periodically as well as at certain defined time 
constraints on roles, user-role assignments as well as 
assignment of role-permission. According to DEERBAC 
model, in certain time duration the roles can be further 
restricted as a consequence of numerous activation 
constraints and highest possible active duration constraints. 
The dominant contributions of DEERBAC model can the 
extension and optimization in the existing TRBAC framework 
and its event and triggering expressions. The predominant 
uniqueness of this model is that this system inherits the 
expression of role hierarchies and Separation of Duty (SoD) 
constraints that specifies the fine-grained temporal semantics. 
The results obtained illustrates that the DEERBAC system 
provides optimum solution for efficient user-creation, role 
assignment and security management framework in cloud 
environment with higher user count and the simultaneous role-
permission, even without compromising with the security 
issues.  
 
Keywords: role based access control system, cloud 
environment, trbac, security management, temporal 
constraints, and separation of duty. 
I. Introduction 
n order to accomplish the goal of security 
management system, the Role based Access Control 
(RBAC) system models have played a significant role. 
The RBAC approach has established itself as the highly  
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robust, generalized and powerful approach to perform 
security management operations. The role based 
access control systems do facilitate the efficient and 
effective assignment of role to the users and its 
respective permission to them. A user being the 
member of certain category can achieve the permission 
of a certain role. The functional environment or 
organization where certain roles are assigned to users 
with predefined privilege, the RBAC model can be a 
significant player. In fact the flexibility and robustness of 
RBAC model makes it to facilitate expression of 
numerous security policies such as discretionary as well 
as mandatory along with the specific policies defined by 
either user of the organization. Few of the predominant 
contribution of RBAC system models are its optimum 
support in security management and the principal of 
minimum privileges. Such management facilities 
encompass the capability of managing the role 
generation, assignment and re-assignment of roles in 
case of change in certain user’s responsibility.  
Furthermore, the role-permission management is 
accomplished by means of role hierarchies’ generation, 
clustering of objects into certain object classes.  
The robustness, advantages and its relevancies 
makes this approach highly desirable for investigation 
and further optimization. This is the matter of fact that 
this presented system model has gained a lot of 
optimization and maturity, still it lacks in certain specific 
applications and of course in cloud environment this 
system does suffer from few limitations like its 
incompatibility with cloud system variant. On the other 
hand, the applications functional with temporal 
semantics like work-flow based system model do suffer 
a lot. With certain applications in organizations, the 
system process and its function could have certain 
defined and limited time or periodic temporal durations. 
In fact such events are in immense presence 
with advanced cloud system with cloud sharing and 
resource utilization. The requirement for a definite time 
function or operation can be assisted by means of 
characterizing the time duration when the role can be 
enabled or activate by user. The defined time or duration 
role can be additionally restricted for few certain time 
spans. Additionally, on the basis of the requirements of 
the organization, the span of function can be different in 
different operational periods.   
I 
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Initially the research group, Bertino et al. [16] 
proposed a Temporal RBAC system, referred as TRBAC 
model that considers and introduces few dominant 
temporal problems allied with RBAC systems. The 
predominant characteristics of this system model 
encompass the periodic enabling of roles and the 
temporal dependencies among numerous roles that can 
be presented by means of events or triggers.  
A particular role is referred to be enabled in 
case it is considered by a user. In general the priorities 
are allied with the role events, which are in conjunction 
with a combination of precedence rules which is further 
employed for resolving constraints conflicts.  
The temporal-RBAC system model also permits 
certain administrator to provide a runtime request for 
activating or enabling or deactivating certain rules. This 
security management scheme, then while lacks in 
handling numerous other significant system constraints 
that can be presented as follows:  
Initially, the system model in fact doesn’t consist 
of temporal constraints either for role creation of users 
or for permission of role. The model considers that all 
the roles can be enabled or disabled at different time 
intervals.  
Here, in the presented paper, it has been 
presented that in certain cloud applications; the roles 
are required to be static which refers that these roles are 
active all the time, on the other hand, the users and the 
permission employed on them could be transient. Here 
it has also been presented that the temporal RBAC 
model is capable of handling only the temporal 
constraints for role enabling then while it is not capable 
of supporting well-defined clear motives for performing 
role enabling and its activation. A particular role is stated 
as active in case minimum a single user considers that. 
Hence, the existing Temporal RBAC systems are not 
capable of handling numerous system constraints which 
are allied with the activation of a particular role like the 
constraints on the highest duration permitted to certain 
user and the maximum count of activations of a role by 
user in a defined time span. It can also be found that the 
existing RBAC models doesn’t takes into account of 
time constraints and the constraints functional in the real 
time activations of user and even it doesn’t cares of goal 
of enabling or disabling the system constraints.   
In fact, the activation constraints must be 
defined clearly in relation with the time of enabling of 
certain role. Considering this prime requirement here in 
this paper we have considered the system constraints of 
role enabling or disabling. Here, it can also be found 
that the temporal base RBAC system doesn’t depicts 
the time based semantics of the hierarchies of roles and 
the dominantly the separation of duty (SoD) constraints.   
Here, in the presented manuscript we have 
illustrated the significance of model constraints, and we 
have proposed a highly robust and effective system 
called DEERBAC system. The proposed DEERBAC 
system model subsumes all the expected 
characteristics of the temporal based RBAC system 
models. The presented work and DEERBAC model can 
be a potential candidate for role based access control 
system that considers every functional or operational 
constraints and access control policies.   A similar work 
was done in [17] as the Temporal Data Authorization 
Model (TDAM) [17] which expresses the policies for 
access control on the basis of temporal characteristics 
data. In However, TDAM does not take into account of 
temporal characteristics of user for assignment of roles.   
The presented manuscript has been organized 
in the following way: Section 2 discusses the related 
works of the proposed issues which is followed by 
Section 3 that presents the RBAC model or NIST RBAC 
model with periodic expression. Section 4 presents 
temporal constraints in DEERBAC model with periodic 
constraints, temporal constraints and the role activation. 
Section 5 discusses the DEERBAC conflict resolution 
and the execution model for proposed system which is 
followed by Section 6 that presents temporal hierarchy 
and separation of duty constraints with elaborated 
security check function and algorithm development. The 
results obtained for the developed model has been 
given in Section 7 which is followed by conclusion in 
Section 8.  
II. Related Work 
A significant contribution was made by a 
research group Zhu Tianyi [1] in which the researchers 
developed a robust RBAC system referred by coRBAC  
which is in fact an optimally enhanced role based 
access control system for dynamic and competitive 
cloud environment. The coRBAC approach was 
functional with a hypothesis that inheriting the available 
RBAC’s model for roles generation and assignments 
with dRBAC’s domain model, the access control could 
be optimized for those all services which are provided 
on the platform of cloud computation. The significant 
contribution of that approach was in fact reduction in 
processing cost with multi-level cache and connection 
set up enhancement. In spite of these plus points this 
work could not discuss the temporal constraints and key 
constraints that could be optimized to make this system 
more optimum for competitive cloud environment and 
this work kept moving around time minimization only, 
which cannot be considered as optimum solution. A 
refined approach with numerous security principals was 
introduced by Wei Li et al in [2] where on the basis of 
few key security attributes the users and respective 
applications were separated and justified works for its 
security robustness. The lacking point of this work was 
dominantly the consideration of key entities of RBAC 
with real time operation and upto certain extent a work in 
[3] tried to introduce real time pinch for cloud 
applications. In [3] on-demand access-control infra was 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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developed that encompassed establishment of dynamic 
Security Provisioning in Cloud Environments Using Dynamic Expiration Enabled Role Based Access 
Control Model
trust in IaaS cloud framework. In order to achieve the 
better configurability and management of authorization 
they introduced XACML based role based access 
control and employed authorization key for secure 
session establishment among numerous players in 
cloud environment. In fact this work sounds good for 
security among multiple dynamic players but while 
considering the dynamic inter-relation between service 
providers by means of identity management, this 
approach was found shell-confined. Considering one 
application like electronic health records (EHR) for 
secure data sharing a work was done in [4][13] where 
they employed identity and attributes oriented 
encryption altogether so as to get access control 
policies enhanced. In fact this work was confined to the 
EHR only and could not address the problem of RBAC 
in real application. Anil L. Pereira et al [5] came out with 
certain enhanced work where they proposed a RBAC 
scheme for grid database application and functions to 
be employed in open framework of grid database called 
OGSA-DAI. Here they introduced an efficient grid-based 
middleware platform for accessing control on data at 
source and sink. The lacking point of this work was the 
excessive administrative system overheads and for its 
resolution the authors employed a community 
authorization service for supporting RBAC and OGSA-
DAI. This work was untouched with the key issues of 
temporal constraints and key constraints of real time 
cloud environment. The enhancement with optimized 
characteristics was done in [14] while considering 
localized division and the approach of area of 
responsibility (AoR). Encryption based RBAC was 
optimized in work [15] in which the authors introduced 
accurate syntax for a computational adaptation of RBAC 
framework while offering precise introduction of 
cryptographic policy enforcement. The consideration of 
temporal; constraints with the goal of policy realization 
could be better as compared to techniques introduced 
in this work. An effort to consider temporal RBAC was 
done by Masood et al [6] where they performed the 
conformance realization of temporal RBAC system. 
Since, this work was a testing approach for temporal 
RBAC, so
 
it could not expand its fins for policy 
optimization and generalized policy realization with real 
time operations. Similar to [4] in certain work [8][12] an 
application oriented RBAC model was made by Hua 
Wang et al and Y.Chen et al respectively, for payment 
application. This work was motivated for RBAC 
integration with payment module so had confined 
scopes for further enhancements or optimization. K. 
Sohr et al [9] introduced few constraints like non-
temporal and past-oriented authentication constraints 
for object constraint language (OCL) and realized 
system for RBAC policies and validated on UML 
specification environment. The authorization engine 
introduced in this work delivered success to certain limit 
but the consideration of non-temporal constraints make 
this work confined. S. Jha et al in his work [10] 
proposed a formal verification approach for enhancing 
the present RBAC plocicy specification and access 
management. Here they classified the classes of 
security for RBAC implementation and reviewed the
 
key 
factors contributing the computational complexity by 
means of a lattice of numerous sub-cases of the issues 
for numerous restrictions. Masood eta l [11] generated a 
test guide for RBAC be implementing few key schemes 
that detect faults efficiently, and they developed two 
schemes for minimizing size of generalized suites by 
means of random paths in RBAC policy model. Atluri et 
al. [17] in their work come out with Temporal Data 
Authorization Model (TDAM) which can effectively 
present the access control policies on the basis of the 
temporal characteristic of data, like valid and transaction 
time. Additionally, TDAM
 
does not provide the system 
constraints that do support the constraints on roles. 
Thus, the temporal constraints that can be presented in 
TDAM
 
model are different from those that can be 
expressed in the proposed DEERBAC
 
system model.  
The proposed DEERBAC system model system can 
perform capturing temporal constraints characteristics 
of data present only at the level of permission by using 
time-constrained role-permission assignments and 
triggers only. The aforementioned TDAM system model 
can, therefore, augment the capabilities of the 
DEERBAC
 
model. Disparate to the TDAM
 
model, the 
DEERBAC
 
also takes into account of temporal 
characteristics of users and system/organizational 
functions given by certain roles.  Considering these 
reviews and existing approaches it can stated that to the 
best of our knowledge, hierarchies and separation of 
duty constraints with temporal semantics have not been 
addressed in the literature.
 
III.
 
Overview
 
The following section presents the overview of a 
model called as NIST role based access control and the 
periodic expression.
 
a)
 
The NIST RBAC Model 
 This RBAC model was proposed by a scholar 
group named Ferraiolo et al. [19] which comprised of 
four fundamental components as a set of users, a 
cluster of roles, permission of roles and a defined time 
set. Here the user means a human body or might be an 
autonomous agent. In this case a particular role is 
referred to as a combination of permission required for 
performing certain defined function. Similarly, a 
permission states for the mode of access which can be 
exhibited on an object in the organization or framework 
and similarly a session connects to certain user with 
probably multiple roles.  In individual operational time 
duration a particular user for requesting the activation of 
certain roles for which it is assumed to be permitted. 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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when the allied role is activated at the occasion of 
request and the specific user is issued permission for 
role activation. In role based access control systems 
considering the four sets; users, roles, role-permissions, 
and duration, a number of functions are defined. The 
role assignment for user (𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 ) and the assignment of role 
permission (𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝).The functions user role assignment (𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟)
 and role permission assignment (𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 ) exhibits the 
function of user assignments or creation and its role 
permission respectively. Individual session is measured 
and
 
assigned to certain defined tasks. In case of roles 
𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎
 
Roles, condition 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 ∈  𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏  then in that case, 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎accede to the authorizations of𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
 
. In these kinds of cases, 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎   
exhibits the role of a senior while 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏
 
functions for junior 
role.
 
b)
 
Periodic Expression
 The periodic time is represented by means of a 
symbolic presentation which can be further expressed 
by a tuple
 
〈[start,stop],B〉. In this expression the variable 
B refers a periodic expression denoting an infinite set of 
periodic time instants, and [begin,end]is a time interval 
stating for the lower as well as the upper bounds B, [16].  
The objective of calendar is employed by the periodic 
time in the form of contiguous time intervals. Here, we 
takes into account of certain set of calendars 
comprising of entities like Hours, Days, Weeks, Months, 
and Years, in which the variable Hours states and is 
considered to have the best granularity. Similarly, a sub-
calendar could be formulated among the available 
calendars. 
 With the provided calendars 𝐿𝐿1
 
and 𝐿𝐿2, the calendar 𝐿𝐿1
 
is stated to be a sub-calendar of𝐿𝐿2, 
presented by 𝐿𝐿1 ⊑ 𝐿𝐿2
 
in case the individual time gap of 
𝐿𝐿2
 
is considered by a definite count of intervals of 
calendar L1.
 The comprising calendars could be effectively 
joins for representing
 
a better periodic expression 
stating the periodic intervals like the set of Mondays or 
the set of the 4th day of each month.
 The periodic expression can be given by the 
following expression: 
 
𝐵𝐵 = �𝑄𝑄𝑎𝑎 . 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 ⊳ 𝑔𝑔. 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒ℎ
𝑎𝑎=1 , 
 In the above presented expression 
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 , 𝐿𝐿1,⋯ , 𝐿𝐿ℎ refers the calendars and similarly𝑄𝑄1 =
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑄𝑄1 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑄𝑄𝑎𝑎 ∈  2𝐾𝐾 ∪ {𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎}, 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 ⊑ 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎−1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎 =2,⋯ ,ℎ, 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 ⊑ 𝐿𝐿ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐾𝐾.
 
In this expression 
represents the separation of the first part of the periodic 
expression which further distinguishes the set of initial 
point of the time intervals, from the characterization of 
the time with respect to calendar𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 . In practical the 
variable 𝑄𝑄𝑎𝑎 is not considered in case it possess all 
values on the other hand in case of its vales as singular, 
combination of time instants which does corresponds to 
a defined periodic expression 𝐵𝐵
 
can be given 
by𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵). Meanwhile, the combination of time 
intervals in (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)
 
is given by∏(𝐵𝐵)). 
 IV.
 
Temporal Constraints in Deerbac 
Model: Syntax and Semantic
 a)
 
Periodicity and Duration Constraints on Role
 i.
 
Enabling and Assignments
 
One significant characteristic of the proposed 
DEERBAC model is that in this model the periodicity as 
well as the constraints of duration could be effectively 
employed for numerous components of the role based 
systems and dominantly by constraining the enabling of 
roles and the time of its activation. All of these 
constraints could be employed for roles as well as for 
the users and their role assignment which can be 
scheduled and activated as pert the organization 
requirements. 
 ii.
 
Periodicity Constraints
 
(A,B,P_a:Z).
 
The constraint called periodicity constraints can 
be employed for specifying the accurate time interval in 
the duration of which a particular role can be operated 
for enabling or disabling in the duration in which a role 
or its permission is valid. The expression of these 
constraint expressions posses a general form (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍)where the variable (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍)
 
characterizes 
the time intervals when certain event happens. 
 
The periodicity constraints and its 
implementation on the assignment of user role have 
been given in the following figure (Fig. 1). In this Figure 
the time interval(𝑝𝑝3,𝑝𝑝6) 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑝𝑝8,𝑝𝑝11) when the role s is enabled has been given by the two thick lines. The presented lines above the time axis presents the time 
when the users are assigned certain role s. The intervals when the user role is valid have been given by the dotted lines. For illustration, when a
 
particular user m1
 
is 
permitted for certain role s
 
in the time interval of(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝5), 
then he can perform the activation of role only in the 
duration interval of(𝑝𝑝3,𝑝𝑝5),
 
3X
1X
2X
4X
3M
1M
2M
4M
2p 4p1p 3p 5p 6p 7p 8p 10p 12p11p
 
Figure 1
 
:
  
Periodicity constraint on user-role assignment
 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
III
 I
ss
ue
 X
V
I 
V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
  
 
  
8
  
 
(
DD DD DDDD
)
Y
e
a
r
01
3
2
E
it is depicted by its inimitable element. Meanwhile, 
𝑎𝑎. 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒can also be eliminated in case variable 𝑔𝑔=1. A The role s is assigned to the user m2 in the time interval(𝑝𝑝4,𝑝𝑝10), but it can activate the assigned role 
Security Provisioning in Cloud Environments Using Dynamic Expiration Enabled Role Based Access 
Control Model
  
only in the time span of (𝑝𝑝4,𝑝𝑝6)and(𝑝𝑝8,𝑝𝑝10).
 
Similarly, 
the user m3
 
is permitted s
 
in span(𝑝𝑝2,𝑝𝑝7), but it can 
consider s
 
only in the time duration or interval of(𝑝𝑝3,𝑝𝑝6).
 iii.
 
Duration Constraints �[(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, )|𝑇𝑇 ],𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍�.
 The duration constraints are employed for 
specifying the time durations for which the functions of 
role enabling or its disabling remains valid. Whenever 
certain functions or event takes place this constraint is 
allied with the certain event ensures that event for certain 
definite time duration only. The case when there is no 
any constraint for session for certain event, the event 
sustains in valid state till it is
 
disabled by means of 
triggers.
 In general the duration constraint is presented 
by �[(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, )|𝑇𝑇 ],𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍�
 
for performing role enabling or 
its activation. In this expression the variable 𝑔𝑔
 
refers 
either 𝑆𝑆,𝑀𝑀, 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝐴𝐴, in the relevance of certain events for enabling or disabling is given by expression ENs/Diss respectively and for assignment events “𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆
 
to𝑀𝑀,” and “𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏/𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏  𝐵𝐵 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆, ” respectively. The variable 𝑇𝑇 and 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔states for the time spans like𝑇𝑇 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 . The entity “|”  existing between(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)
 and refers that either (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)or T
 
is specific for certain 
event.
 Here, we do consider two kinds of session 
constraints:
 �(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍�, �𝑇𝑇,𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍�,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍).  In the above mentioned expression the variable (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍)
 
presents that the event 𝑍𝑍
 
remains valid 
only for the span of 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔
 
in the duration of which the 
individual periodic interval is specified by (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵). (𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍)
 
states that this specific
 
constraint 
remains valid all the time. Thus, in case an event 𝑍𝑍
 
takes 
place at certain time then it remains confined for the 
duration of 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 . Another constraint 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = (𝑇𝑇,𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 ,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍)  states that there exists a legitimate time span T
 
in the 
duration of
 
which the duration restriction 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔   is 
implemented to the event𝑍𝑍. The constraint 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
 
is enabled 
for certain time duration𝑇𝑇. In general the duration 
constraint expression possess the similar form as is for 
expression of activation constraint. Therefore
 
the 
semantics of the duration constraints for enabling the 
roles and its assignment to the users is same as that of 
activation constraints. 
 b)
 
Temporal Constraints on Role Activation
 The activation request for roles takes place at 
the discretion of a user at random time and therefore the 
constraints of periodicity on the activation of roles must 
not be enforced. On the other hand, the same constraint 
for duration can be enforced on the activation of roles. In 
the proposed DEERBAC model the duration constraints 
for role activation could be effectively classified into two 
dominant categories: first the total active duration 
constraints while the other refers the maximum time 
span taken for individual activation constraints. 
 The entire active duration constraint for certain 
role prohibits the duration of the role’s activation for 
provides time span. Once the users have employed the 
total active time span for a specific role, then that role 
might not be activated again although it can be enabled 
in future. Here it can be noticed that the whole activation 
time permitted for a role might be of certain intervals in 
which the role has been activated. In fact in the system 
the active duration id classified on the basis of per-role 
and per-user-role assignment.  
 In per-role constraint the total active time span 
is restricted for certain role. As soon as the addition of 
all the durations used for activation of roles approaches 
to the maximum permitted value, then no any activation 
of role is allowed and therefore the existing activation for 
role is terminated. Similarly, the per-user-role constraint 
prohibits the overall count of active duration for a certain 
defined role by certain user. As soon as the user 
employs the overall active time span for the specific 
roles, he is not permitted to activate the role in near 
future, while the other existing users could further 
activate the roles. 
 As soon as this kind of time span or duration 
expires for a defined user, the activation for roles for that 
specific user becomes annulled. Then while, there could 
be activations for the similar roles in the functional 
systems. These model constraints might be 
characterized for per-role or per-user roles.  In per user 
constraint case the constraint prohibits the maximum 
active duration employed for individual role activation by 
certain user, until there exists per user-role constraint is 
specified for that user. The maximum active duration is 
prohibited by means of a per-user-role constraint which 
is permitted for individual activation of the roles of a 
particular user. The duration of activation can be 
confined in a pre-defined time interval. In few 
applications, the prohibition on the number of roles 
might be needed to control the critical resources. This 
kind of cardinality restriction for role activation might be 
classified into two dominant kinds, overall n activations 
constraint where a role is confined to certain n 
activations and second the highest possible n 
constraints for concurrent activations. The second kind 
functions in the manner that a particular role is 
prohibited to n number of activations at certain defined 
time. 
 A particular model constraint for per-role might 
be characterized to prohibit the count of concurrent 
activations of a role to the highest possible value. Same 
or
 
different users could be allied with the activation of 
such kinds of roles. Similarly, the per-user-role 
constraint prohibits the overall number of synchronized 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
activations for a defined role by certain user in the 
defined time duration. 
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  ([(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)|𝑇𝑇 ],𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡)
 In the above presented expression the variable 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
 
states the restriction imposed to particular role 
activation. As illustration,
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = �𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 , �𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 �,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 𝑠𝑠�
 [(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)|𝑇𝑇 ] State for an alternative temporal variable and posses the similar meaning as provided by the constraints of duration. Hence, in the same way as 
the duration constraints, the activation constraint 
considers any one of the three possible 
ways(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡), (𝑇𝑇,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡).  The system constraint (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡)
 
states that the 
prohibition on the activation which is specified by 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
 
is 
applicable for individual enabling of the allied role.  In 
case the constraint 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
 
refers a per-role constraint then it 
possesses an alternative default parameter that can be 
employed for specifying the default value in relation with 
the per-user-role prohibition.
  c)
 
Runtime Requests, Triggering and Constraint 
Enabling
 
In the proposed DEERBAC model, the request 
to enable certain role or permission is considered as a 
runtime event. In the same way, the runtime request of 
the administrator for initializing the process which can 
override any on hand convincing events, are also 
considered for modeling.  
 
These kinds of events are nges or alterations in 
the existing policies. For illustraemployed for overriding 
a pre-specified policy that makes chation, the events for 
disabling certain roles can be initiated by administrator 
for detecting the malicious users in environment. Similar 
requirements in numerous real time applications are 
required for automatically exhibiting certain actions, 
because of the presence of events like the enabling or 
disabling of certain roles. In the proposed DEERBAC 
model, suck kind of dependencies is achieved by 
means of triggering. Additionally, the duration 
constraints functional on role enabling and its 
assignment as well as role activation can be enabled fir 
specified intervals. The proposed DEERBAC model 
consists of expressions for enabling and disabling the 
constraints. The run time request of a user to activate or 
deactivate certain function can be presented by, firstw: 
activating s for m after certain interval ∆p and second,w: 
deactivating s for
 
mafter∆p.
 
The functional priorities allied with such 
requests are considered to be same as for event 
“assign s to m” which authorizes the activation of role s 
by user m. The runtime request expression for 
administrator given as P_a:Zafter ∆pstates a prior itized 
 
If the priority as well as the delay is required to 
be excluded then the variable 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 =⊺
 
is set in which ⊺
 
denotes the maximum priority with zero interval. The 
expression for event or triggering is given as 
𝑍𝑍1,⋯ ,𝑍𝑍ℎ ,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡1,⋯ ,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧 → 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍
 
with the interval of∆𝑝𝑝, in 
which the variable 𝑍𝑍𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤
 
denotes event expressions or in 
other words the runtime requests. Similarly, 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤
 
refers 
the position predicates and 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍refers for a prioritized 
event expression having 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ≺⊺ ,𝑍𝑍 refers the expression in such a way that 𝑍𝑍 ∈ {𝑧𝑧:𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚} and ∆𝑝𝑝denotes for the expression for duration. Here it can also be noticed that because of the users only the 
activation request is made, therefore the particular event 
𝑍𝑍
 
must not be“𝑧𝑧:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚”. It should be noted that the event “𝑧𝑧:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚” is permitted to come out in the head of certain trigger unit as this might be employed for enforcing certain access control policy.
  V.
 
Deerbac Conflict Resolution and 
Execution Semantic
 This presented section of the manuscript 
introduces the key dominant issues that create 
conflictions which ultimately get arose in DEERBAC 
model. This section also discusses the approaches to 
be implemented for resolution of the issues and coming 
up with an optimum system model. Here we define 
certain sets denoted by γ
 
that comprises with all kinds of 
expressions, model constraints as well as triggering in 
proposed DEERBAC system model. Additionally, here 
the users as well as the administrators have been 
considered as a sequence presented by the following 
expression:
 DO=〈DO
 
(0),
 
DO
 
(1),
 
⋯,
 
DO
 
(p),
 
⋯〉.
 
 
  
  a)
 
Various conflicts in proposed 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶
 
model
 
A number of kinds of conflicts might be created 
in proposed 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶
 
model. Unequivocal semantics 
are required for capturing these kinds of conflict. 
 
Fundamentally, there are 3 kinds of conflicts 
that might come into existence for certain provided value 
γ
 
as well as the sequence of request expression𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷. The 
predominant kinds of conflicts are as follows: 
 i.
 
Conflicts occurring in between events of the 
similar classes
 
The events existing in the similar classes are 
allied with the similar kind of pair of the role status or its 
assignment. As for example the event “𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 𝑠𝑠” results into disabled state of role s
 
to an enabled state whereas 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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In general the constraints of activations can be 
presented in the following form:
event that takes place ∆ p time later from the request 
made.
event “𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠" corresponds to altering the status of enable 
of a certain role into its disabled state. 
Security Provisioning in Cloud Environments Using Dynamic Expiration Enabled Role Based Access 
Control Model
In the above mentioned expression it can be 
found that the variable DO (p) ∈ DO refers a set of 
runtime request created at time p.
 
 
ii.
 
Conflicts existing between events of different 
classes
 
Few of the constraints can arise in the event of 
different categories such as an activation request “Activate
 
m
 
for
 
s”
 
and a role disabling event denoted by “Disable
 
role
 
s”
 
might result into the conflicts in case
 
both of these tries to arise at the same time. In the same 
way, the activation event “𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
 
𝑚𝑚
 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟
 
𝑠𝑠”
 
as well as 
the de-assignment of user’s role “𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚  
𝑠𝑠
 
𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓
 
𝑚𝑚”
 
mightn’t take place simultaneously because a user 
might activate certain role only in the case when it is 
permitted certain roles. 
 
iii.
 
Inter-constraint conflicts 
 
These kinds of conflicts might come into 
existence in between two functional constraints which 
are defined by means of role enabling or its assignment. 
 
A particular system conflict might come into 
existence in between the constraints of per-user 
activation and the constraints of per-role activation. 
 
Let’s consider a per-role constraint
 
(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 , �𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 �,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆 _𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚  
𝑠𝑠)
  Similarly, the per-user-role constraint
 
(𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ,𝑚𝑚,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆 _𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚  
𝑠𝑠)
  The initial system constraint refers that the specific role 𝑠𝑠
 
is permitted for its activation for a certain 
defined duration
 
𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 , while another system constraint 
characterizes that the user 𝑚𝑚
 
is permitted for assuming 
role s
 
for the whole duration
 
𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 . In case of declared 
or specified duration 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡
 
all the participating users are 
prohibited or confined to total time called
 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 . There 
might be some ambiguity if the user m
 
must be 
permitted an overall time of activation as 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
 
or
 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡
. 
In case of per-user constraint and with non-definite 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡
  
then a condition can be assumed like
 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 . 
 
The proposed
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶
 
model employs the 
objective of blocked events for resolving the conflicts 
rose in case of constraints of similar or dissimilar 
classes.
 
In this approach whenever decided priorities 
become ineffective then in that case we employs a 
negative takes-precedence principle for troubleshooting 
the conflicts in case of similar kind of constraints. 
 
In this presented paper and the proposed 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶
 
model, we have developed certain dominant 
definitions and procedures that removes the conflicts in 
the possible conflicts arise. 
 
The conflicts created in case of similar or 
dissimilar kind of constraints can be resolved by means 
of the following procedure:
 
Consider the variable 𝑋𝑋
 
represents a set of 
prioritized event expressions as well as a constraint. 
And𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍state a prioritized event expression in case of 𝑍𝑍
 
as an event with
 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎
 
∈
 
Prios. Then the variable 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍can 
be stated as blocked by constraint 𝑋𝑋. This can take place only if the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
1. In case there is𝑎𝑎 ∈  𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠, in such a way that 𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 (𝑍𝑍)  ∈  𝑋𝑋 and further the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
a. If 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍
 
and 𝑎𝑎 ∶  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 (𝑍𝑍)might arise like in the case of similar constraints 
 
1conflict, then either
 
An event 𝑍𝑍be in contacts to some other event 
𝑍𝑍1
 
and𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎  ≼  𝑎𝑎 or ii. The event Z
 
is corresponding with Z2
 
in case 
of 𝑎𝑎 ≺  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ; b. Similarly, in case 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶  Z and 𝑎𝑎 ∶  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 (𝑍𝑍) may arise in case of dissimilar kinds of constraints and thus can𝑤𝑤
 
: Act 𝑠𝑠
 
for 𝑚𝑚
 
Here, the set of the events which are not 
blocked in events in the prioritized event expression X
 
which is given in terms ofNonblocked(X). Additionally, in 
case of both similar as well as dissimilar kind of 
constrains or conflicts caused in these circumstances 
the events which is blocked by similar constraints can 
be eliminated prior to eliminating events blocked by the 
constraints caused due to dissimilar kind of constraints. 
Additionally in case the set of prioritized event 
expression 𝑋𝑋
 
with valid constraints present in the form 
of([(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)|𝑇𝑇 ,𝐷𝐷]), the events are blocked by means of 
those constraints which are evaluated at last. 
 
After resolving the problem or conflicts caused 
in the case of similar constraints, here in the presented 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶
 
model we ensure that a particular activation 
event is blocked by means of disabling the roles or de-
assignment of that particular role. In case there are more 
activation requests for a role then few of them might be 
required to be blocked or de-assigned. In fact there is 
the need of a criterion of predefined selection that can 
select the activation requests which are suppose to be 
blocked. Here in this work we have considered a 
selection criterion which o depends on the priority of the 
received activation requests, or on the basis of duration 
in which the activation has to be made. Similarly, in case 
of the conflicts caused because of inter-constraints or in 
between the constraints can be eliminated by means of 
the below mentioned approach as implemented with our 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 model.  Consider �𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 , �𝑝𝑝ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 �,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 : 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷  𝑠𝑠� presents a per-role constraint and �𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,𝑚𝑚,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷  𝑠𝑠� refers a per-user-role constraint which is defined for the similar role 𝑠𝑠
 
and
 𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷 ∈ {𝑆𝑆_ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚, 𝑆𝑆_𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚, 𝑆𝑆_ℎ, 𝑆𝑆_𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎} Then, the rules presented below can be applied: 
 1.
 
In case there exist the activation constraints of the 
similar kinds for certain roles then the constraint with 
the highest priority can block the other constraints. 
 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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2. In case of both the per-role parameter 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴and the 
per user-role parameter 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋 , the initial one 
overrides the latter. 
3. In case of the default parameter 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  as well as the 
per-user-role parameter 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 , the highly specialized 
per user-role constraint would override the 
comparatively less-specific per-role constraint. 
b) Deerbac Execution Model 
On the basis of the rules for resolving the 
conflicts as discussed in the previous section, here in 
this section of the presented manuscript the execution 
semantics of the proposed DEERBAC model has been 
discussed. Here we do define the system states and 
traces then a robust system model is constructed for 
execution of DEERBAC model. Here the definitions for 
capturing the events at each instant of time have been 
prepared and accordingly the state generation 
algorithms have been developed.  
The dynamics of the events and the numerous 
states of the role enabling and its activations in the 
proposed DEERBAC can be given in terms of numerous 
snapshots and for the same here in this paper we have 
developed two snapshots where the individual 
snapshots refers towards the respective roles and the 
present set of prioritized events, position of certain roles, 
permission assignments, etc.  For the aforementioned 
requirements we have developed two snapshots called 
as m-snapshot and s-snapshots. 
In the first case of m-snapshots, for user m in 
respect of its role s, presents a 
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 (𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,  𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 ,  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 ,𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 ,𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 ,ℎ𝑎𝑎) where 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 and 
𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 in such a way that user m is allotted certain 
role s. 
Similarly, the another snapshot(s-snapshot) for 
certain role 𝑠𝑠 can be expressed as (𝑟𝑟,𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ,ℎ𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ,ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 ,𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 ,𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 , 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠).  
These developed snapshots are employed for 
developing the events, roles status and its assignments, 
which are obtained by non-blocked events and system 
trace. 
The system model in the form of system trace 
has been presented as follows:   
i. Calculation of System Trace (ST)  
In general a system trace is comprised of 
infinite sequences of m-snapshots (ZW) and s-
snapshots (XD), so that for all the integerst ≥ 0: 
Algorithm 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 
Parametric participation:(𝑝𝑝,𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍,𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝;  
Results: 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝); 
/* At 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷 (0) = (𝑠𝑠, ∞, ∞, ∞, ∞ 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒,∅,∅). For individual pair (𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚) 
the associated snapshots 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 and 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 have been employed. 
Consider that 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝) ← {  𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 |𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎�𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝)� ∗/   
 
Phase 1: Assignment handling 
FOREACH event 𝑍𝑍 that is the subset of N𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎�𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝)� perform 
(DO) 
Perform for Event (𝑍𝑍):  
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 to 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚 : 𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 ← 𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 − {𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝}; 
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵 to 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠  : 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 ← 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 − {𝐵𝐵}; 
𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 role permission 𝐵𝐵 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠 : 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 ← 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 ∪ {𝐵𝐵}; 
𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 role 𝑠𝑠 to user 𝑚𝑚  : 
𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 ← 𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 ∪ {(𝑀𝑀, ∞, ∞, ∞, ∞ 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠,∅,∅)  
Deactivate role s of the user m  : remove (𝑚𝑚,𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 ) 
The ascending algorithm represents the 
algorithm for performing role deactivation of disabling 
events. 
Phase 2: Performing role disabling event 
FOREACH events for 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎�𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝)�, perform 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ← 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎; 
IF𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝))THEN 
Define and update per-role parameters of 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 to ∞ 
FOREACH𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 that 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟 , perform (DO) 
Update (𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 ) (𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 ) ←  (∅,∅); 
IF�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)�  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 �𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔−1 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)� 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 
Define and update per-user-role parameters of role assigning span 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 
to ∞ 
Phase 3: Handling of valid model constraints
 
FOREACH((𝐷𝐷,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝 − 1) and (𝐷𝐷,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) ∉ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)) where 𝐷𝐷 ∈{(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵),𝑇𝑇} 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  is a per-role activation constraint  
Perform (DO)
 
IF(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔)THEN 
Update per-role parameter of the corresponding 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝
 
with infinity.
 
 
 
Phase 4: Performing process of role-enabling  
FOREACH (Enable for role 𝑠𝑠 that is subset of 
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎�𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝)�perform 
IF𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝. 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 / 
Update 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡. 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and enable it  
FOREACH ([(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)|𝑇𝑇 ],𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)) set the per-role parameter of 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 
to 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 value specified in constraint  𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  
Once the role enabling has been performed in 
this work we develop an algorithm for activation of valid 
roles and users. The following mentioned algorithm 
describes the processing of request for valid role 
activation. 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Security Provisioning in Cloud Environments Using Dynamic Expiration Enabled Role Based Access 
Control Model
Phase 5: Processing request for valid role activation 
FOREACH run-time request (𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚)which is the subset 
of �𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝)�, perform,  
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝.ℎ𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ← 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝.ℎ𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 − 1;  𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝. ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 − 1;    
FOREACH([(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵)|𝑇𝑇 ],𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡)  ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)such that 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  is a constraint on role 
𝑠𝑠 
Perform, the following 
IF (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  is per-user-role constraint) THEN 
Update the per-user-role parameter of the corresponding 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 to that in 
constraint𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 . 
Else /* 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  retains per-role constraint */ 
In case (per-user-role default value is specified in constraint 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ) 
Update the per-user-role parameter of the 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 by its default value; 
Otherwise,  
Update the per-user-role parameter of 𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 to the per-role value in 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ; 
Now update,  
𝑝𝑝 ← min⁡(𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴 ,𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎); /* update the remaining role value */ 
Sum up (𝑤𝑤, 𝑝𝑝,𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 ); 
 
Phase 6: Process constraint variables for the currently active roles and 
user-role activation 
FOREACH role𝑠𝑠 − 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 
DO 
IF𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒_𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠=enabled THEN 
Decrement role durations; 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ← 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 − |𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎(𝑠𝑠)|; 
ELSE, Update role duration, 
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ← 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 − 1; 
FOREACH user assign role 𝑠𝑠 
Update, 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 − 1 
A trace is referred to as canonical only 
when 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷(0) = set of 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 of the form (𝑠𝑠, ∞, ∞, ∞, ∞ 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠,∅,∅) for all 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠 in the system.  
Here we do consider that a particular system 
model starts from a preliminary state at certain time 
instant 𝑝𝑝 =  0, when all the role remain in the disabled 
state and no user-role assignments, role-permission 
assignments, or valid activation constraints remains in 
the active state. The objective of the 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 trace 
along with these kinds of preliminary state is presented 
with the help of a canonical trace. The set 
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎(𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 (𝑝𝑝)) comprised of the maximal priority 
events which in general takes place at time𝑝𝑝. Here it 
should be noted that γ and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 estimates a unique event 
state and it can also be noted that the individual state 
information present in 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)concerning the active state 
of certain defined roles rely on the constraints of 
activation which is enabled at time𝑝𝑝. In fact a session 
constraint or the constraint of role-activation (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) is 
functional only when the enable event 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is 
in Nonblocked(𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡)). 
In this paper the algorithm ComputeXD, has 
been developed which estimates another state from 
certain existing event state employing a given set of 
events and authenticable constraints. On the basis of 
unblocked events and the present set of genuine 
constraints, the presented algorithm performs the 
update of the state information available. The events in Nonblocked (𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 (𝑝𝑝) takes place at time𝑝𝑝.  
As mentioned in the algorithm in phase 1, all the 
assignment/de-assignment of nonblocked events takes 
place which is preceded by phase 2 where the role 
disabling events happens. It should be noted that 
whenever a particular role is disabled, the role− specific
 and the user − specific
 
system variables are reset to ∞, 
that depicts that in case there are no any constraints for 
per-role or per-user-role constraints, then in that 
situation the activation session as well as the count of 
concurrent activations are infinite or unlimited. 
 Phase 3 presents the conversion of per-role 
parameters takes place into their initial singular 1 value 
in correspondence with the activation constraints that 
become invalid.  Phase 4 initializes the per-role 
constraint variables of the recently enabled roles which 
are followed by the activation of roles in phase 5. In this 
assignment process, initially the cardinality variables 
per-role and per-user-role are decremented so as to 
extract the remaining count of activations permitted 
once the activation request is granted. Then, the 
initialization of user constraint variable is initialized and 
the details of the session are updated to the session list. 
In phase 6, the decrement of the left over active duration 
for individual role is processed and thus the overall role 
session is managed in accordance. In case of the 
disabled roles, the session constraint, for both entities 
roles as well as users permitted to them, are 
decremented. 
 The following theorem shows that the algorithm 
terminates correctly. Also, the theorem provides the 
complexity of the algorithm.
 
ii.
 
Correctness and complexity analysis of 
Calc_systemtrace
  
 
With the provided variable 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 (𝑝𝑝),𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝 –  1),  andγ, the algorithm 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒:
 1.
 
Generates 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)
 
in such a way that the updated 
status in 𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝)satisfies all the possible constraints 
in Γ
 
and those all valid activation constraints 
functional in the interval (𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝 +  1), and   2.
 
Eliminates the complexity and is presented by 
 𝑄𝑄�ℎ𝑆𝑆(ℎ𝑀𝑀 + ℎ𝐵𝐵 + ℎ𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎 )�,
 Here ℎ𝑆𝑆 ,ℎ𝑀𝑀,ℎ𝐵𝐵 and ℎ𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎  states for the number of roles, users, permissions and the maximum count of 
durations respectively in the developed system model.
 With a defined parameter γ
 
and a request 
stream𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, it is required to identify events in𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
 spontaneously, the individual event must be initiated by 
means of certain element of γ
 
orDO. As soon as a 
trigger initiates certain prioritized event, the expression 
of the event in the body of the trigger must not be 
blocked. 
 The events in 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 can be defined in the following manner: 
 
iii.
 
Caused Events
 iv.
 
With a provided variables like trace, a γ  and a 
request sequence DO, the combination of the 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
generated prioritized events at certain time p, is 
Security Provisioning in Cloud Environments Using Dynamic Expiration Enabled Role Based Access 
Control Model
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the minimum set Caused(p, ZW, XD γ , DO) which do satisfy the conditions given below: 
 If (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 )and 𝑝𝑝 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵), then𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 ∈𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝). (In case of periodicity constraint)
 If (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍  after interval ∆𝑝𝑝) ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝 − ∆𝑝𝑝)∆𝑝𝑝 ≤𝑝𝑝),
 
then 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝);(In case of runtime request) If �𝑍𝑍1,⋯ ,𝑍𝑍ℎ ,𝒞𝒞1,⋯ ,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 → 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 → 𝑃𝑃:𝑍𝑍 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 ∆𝑝𝑝� ∈ 𝛾𝛾 and the following conditions hold, then 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡Set(p); (In case of trigger initiation):
 0 ≤ ∆p ≤ p.
 ∀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡a , in such a way that (1 ≤ a ≤ l),𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡a  holds (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡ais 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  or 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡p  
∀𝑍𝑍a in such a way that (1 ≤ 𝑎𝑎 ≤ ℎ),𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝 − ∆𝑝𝑝) not
 
blocked by 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(p − ∆p).
 In case
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = (A, B, E) ∈ γAnd p ∈ StI(𝐴𝐴, B)        (for constraints of 
duration/activation constraints)
 0 ≤ ∆p = (p − p1) ≤ Te .
 [𝐺𝐺 → 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍after duration ∆p] ∈ Γ or a runtime request 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎:𝑍𝑍  ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝_1), as a result of which 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍  ∈𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡Set(p − p1)
 
not blocked (ZW(p − p1)), then 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝): If 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = (𝑇𝑇,𝐷𝐷) ∈ 𝛾𝛾where𝐷𝐷 ∈ {𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆,𝐵𝐵}, and if there 
exists a pair p1, p2
 
such that
 p1 − p2and∆𝑝𝑝1=(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝1) ≤ 𝑝𝑝.
 (∃[𝐺𝐺 → 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶ EN𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  after ∆p1]) ∈ γ OR𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝 −𝑝𝑝1)as
 
a consiquence of which enable 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡Set(p − p1)
 and is not blocked by 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝1)), then  s ∶ 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡Set(p); Additionally, in case 𝐷𝐷 =  (𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍) ∈ 𝛾𝛾refers a duration constraint in such a way that a ∈ {M, S, B}, and the below mentioned conditions are satisfied 
 ∃[𝐺𝐺 → 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 after ∆p2] ∈ γ OR 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝2), as a result of which 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍 ∈𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(p − p2)
 
and is not blocked by 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(p − p2), 
then𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝)
 
and v: enable 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡Set(p), In this expression the variable v
 
states for the 
priority level specified fora.
 The defined condition 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡1 states that all the events are scheduled with the help of or after 
processing a periodic event by adding into the set caused(𝑃𝑃,𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍,𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷, 𝛾𝛾,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷).
 Similarly, the other conditions can also indicate 
for adding up of the
 
explicit runtime requests into the 
setCaused(𝑝𝑝,𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍,𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷, 𝛾𝛾,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷),
 
scheduling with trigger 
function with provided that the conditions 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤 
specified 
in the body of the trigger are satisfied and each of the 
events 𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤occurs at time𝑝𝑝 − 𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝.
 
VI.
 
Deerbac Temporal Hierarchies and 
Separation of Duty Constraints
 
The constraints like temporal hierarchies and 
the Separation of Duty (SoD) play a significant role in the 
specification of the roles in certain policies and the 
security management in cloud environment. In this 
proposed DEERBAC model we have considered the 
temporal hierarchies as well as the separation of duty 
(SoD) constraints which has performed well and the 
overall optimization has achieved by means of such 
system
 
modeling.
 I.
 
Algorithm𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑁𝑁
 
II.
 
Parametric Input:
 
TCAB 𝑝𝑝
 
III.
 
Output:true
 
if 𝒯𝒯
 
is safe, false otherwise 
 
IV.
 
Update H← 0;𝑍𝑍 ← 0;
 
V.
 
FOR all [𝐺𝐺 ← 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍] ∈ 𝑝𝑝
 
DO
 
VI.
 
IF (𝑍𝑍 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚) THEN return false;  VII.
  
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝐻𝐻 ← 𝐻𝐻 ∪ {𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 : 𝑠𝑠}; VIII.
 
FOR all [𝐺𝐺 → 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍] ∈ 𝑃𝑃
 
DO
 
IX.
  
FORALL 𝑍𝑍′ ∈ 𝐺𝐺
 
such that ∃𝑎𝑎; 𝑎𝑎:𝑍𝑍′ ∈ 𝐻𝐻
 
DO
 
X.
  
𝑍𝑍 ← 𝑍𝑍 ∪ {〈𝑎𝑎:𝑍𝑍′ , +𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎〉}
 
XI.
  
FOR all 𝑠𝑠:𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶(𝑍𝑍′),∈ 𝐻𝐻
 
such that 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠
 
DO
 
XII.
  
𝑍𝑍 ← 𝑍𝑍 ∪ {〈𝑠𝑠:𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶(𝑍𝑍′),−,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎〉}
 
XIII.
 
/* Generation of cycle and its verification  */
 
XIV.
 
Estimation of strongly connected components(SCC) of < 𝐻𝐻,𝑍𝑍 >
 
XV.
 
FOR all < 𝐻𝐻’,𝑍𝑍’ > ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 DO XVI.
 
    FOR all < 𝐷𝐷, 𝑎𝑎 > ∈ 𝑍𝑍′ DO XVII.
  
IF 1= ‘-‘ THEN return false;
 
XVIII.
 
return true;
 
Figure 2 : 
  
Algorithm 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑁𝑁. Permitting the permission-inheritance in the proposed DEERBAC model the role hierarchies can 
effectively reduce the overall system overhead allied with 
the management of permission administration [19]. 
SoDs Comprised of constructive restrictions for 
prohibiting the possible deception to which certain user 
could have done by means of certain conflicting 
activities [19], [16]. In this section of the presented 
manuscript for DEERBAC model we have presented the 
fundamental semantics of hierarchies and SoDs with
 
respect to time. In a temporal context, it becomes 
important for establishing certain unambiguous 
semantics of permission-inheritance and role-activation 
in certain system hierarchy when enabling or activating 
hierarchies allied with the roles to be considered. In a 
role hierarchy, permission-inheritance semantics make 
out the permissions to which a specific role can accede 
to its subordinate roles. In the same way, once a role is 
allotted to certain user, the role-activation semantics 
finds out the set of
 
subordinate roles to that specific 
user can activate. 
 
Previous to depicting the temporal hierarchies 
and time based𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠, here we would discuss about the 
four status predicates, given by, 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝)𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝)
 
𝒞𝒞𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝),𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝) Predicate 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴((𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝)
 
states that user 𝑠𝑠
 
can activate certain role 𝑠𝑠
 
at period𝑡𝑡, implying that user 
𝑚𝑚
 
is assigned to role 𝑠𝑠. In the same way, can be 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝)states that permission 𝐵𝐵
 
is implicitly or 
explicitly is allotted to role 𝑠𝑠, whereas can 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝)
 
refers that role 𝐵𝐵
 
is implicitly or 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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explicitly permitted to 𝑚𝑚. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝)Depicts that 
𝑚𝑚 achieves the permission 𝐵𝐵 at time 𝑝𝑝 in session 𝑤𝑤. 
The first proverb employed here in this work 
states (𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔(𝑅𝑅, 𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇) → 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏_𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑅𝑅, 𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇)) states that in 
Security Provisioning in Cloud Environments Using Dynamic Expiration Enabled Role Based Access 
Control Model
      
 
     
    
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 :  Extended Status Predicates 
I. Predicate  II. Meaning  
III. 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸(𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) IV. Role 𝑠𝑠 is enabled at 
time 𝑝𝑝 
V. (𝑚𝑚_𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔 (𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝)) VI. User 𝑚𝑚 is assigned 
to role 𝑠𝑠 at time 𝑝𝑝 
VII. (𝐵𝐵_𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝)) VIII. Permission 𝐵𝐵 is 
assigned to role 𝑠𝑠 at 
time 𝑝𝑝 
IX. 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝) X. User 𝑚𝑚 can active 
role 𝑠𝑠 at time 𝑝𝑝 
XI. 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤, 𝑝𝑝) XII. User 𝑚𝑚 can acquire 
permission 𝑤𝑤 at time 
𝑝𝑝 
XIII. 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝑤𝑤, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝) XIV. Permission 𝑤𝑤 can be 
acquire through role 
𝑠𝑠 at time 𝑝𝑝 
XV. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝) XVI. Role 𝑠𝑠 is active in 
user 𝑚𝑚 s at time𝑝𝑝 
XVII. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝) XVIII. User 𝑚𝑚’ acquires 
permission 𝐵𝐵 in 
session 𝑤𝑤at 𝑝𝑝 
XIX. Proverbs : for all 𝑠𝑠 ∈ Roles, 
𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠,𝐵𝐵 ∈ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑤 ∈ Sessions, and time instant 
𝑝𝑝 ≥ 0, the following implications hold: 
XX. 1 XXI. 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝)  →  𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 (𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝) 
XXII. 2 XXIII. 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝)  →  𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) 
XXIV. 3 XXV. 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝)  ∧ 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝)   → 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑇𝑇) 
XXVI. 4 XXVII. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝)  ∧  𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝)  → 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑤𝑤, 𝑝𝑝) 
In general the unrestricted and enabling-time 
restricted hierarchies can be categorized into three 
broad categories: inheritance-only hierarchy (𝐼𝐼 −
ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆), activation-only hierarchy(𝐴𝐴 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆), 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 inheritance-activation hierarchy (𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆). 
  
 
 
 
In 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 model 𝐴𝐴 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 states that 
in case a user 𝑚𝑚 can activate certain role 𝑠𝑠, and 𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 , 
then that user can also activate role 𝐴𝐴, even if that user 
𝑚𝑚 is not explicitly allotted to 𝐴𝐴. Whenever the enabling 
time durations allied to the hierarchically related roles in 
partial overlap, it becomes required to consider the 
problem of application of inheritance and activation 
semantics in intervals in which only one role remains 
active or is in enabled status.  So as to capture the 
inheritance and activation semantics when the enabling 
times of the hierarchically related roles partially overlap, 
here in the proposed 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 model we have 
introduced the approach of 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 and 
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 hierarchies where the weakly 
restricted hierarchies permits the inheritance or 
activation semantics in the non-overlapping intervals, on 
the other hand the strongly restricted hierarchies permits 
the inheritance and activation semantics only in the 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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a) Temporal Role Hierarchies
A role hierarchy inflates the extent of the 
authorization acquisition and role-activation semantics 
ahead of the explicit permission assignments in the 
course of the hierarchical relations among various roles. 
In the proposed DEERBAC model we have defined three 
categories of hierarchies:
1. Unrestricted hierarchies: this is that hierarchy, in 
which the role activation semantics and the 
permission-inheritance semantics are not influenced 
by the presence of any duration constraints on the 
hierarchically related roles,
2. Enabling time restricted hierarchies: In this case the 
permission-inheritance and role-activation 
semantics highly depending upon the enabling 
duration of the hierarchically allied or associated 
roles, the third one is
3. Activation time restricted hierarchies, in which the 
permission-inheritance and role-activation 
semantics depend on the active states of the 
hierarchically related roles.
case permission is allotted to a role, the permission can 
be accomplished with the help of that specific role. 
Similarly another adage stated in the form 
((𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) → 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝)) states that all the 
users allotted or permitted to a role can activate their 
respective roles. Axiom
(𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) ∧ 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝)) 
states that if a user 𝑚𝑚 can activate 𝑎𝑎 role 𝑠𝑠, then in that 
case all the possible permissions which can be retrieved 
by 𝑠𝑠 can be accomplished by user 𝑚𝑚. Similarly, proverb
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠,𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝) ∧ 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐵𝐵, 𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) → 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑚𝑚,𝐵𝐵,𝑤𝑤,𝑝𝑝)
states that if there is user duration in which a user 𝑚𝑚 has 
activated certain role 𝑠𝑠, and then 𝑚𝑚 achieves all the 
permissions which can be achieved with the help of 
role 𝑠𝑠. Considering these truism it can be found that the 
inception two consecutive proverbs state that 
permission acquisition and role-activation semantics are 
monitored and managed by the explicit user-role and 
role-permission assignments.
The conditions for the 𝐷𝐷 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 states that 
in case of 𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 , the permissions that can be achieved 
by means of  𝑔𝑔 encompasses all the permissions 
allotted to 𝑔𝑔 and all the permissions which can be 
accomplished by means of role 𝐴𝐴. 
duration of overlapping. As per the condition of weakly 
restricted 𝐷𝐷 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆, in case 𝑔𝑔 ≥𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁 ,𝑝𝑝 𝐴𝐴, then only 
role 𝑔𝑔 is required to be enabled at time 𝑝𝑝 for applying 
the inheritance semantics and in that case the role 𝐴𝐴 can 
or can’t by enabled at that time. In the same way, for 
the𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆, 𝑔𝑔 ≥𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁 ,𝑝𝑝 𝐴𝐴, only the role 𝐴𝐴 is 
required to be enabled.  
In an activation-time hierarchy 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 a 
user can activate the subordinate role only in the case 
when it has already activated the senior role. It should 
be noted that the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 permits the activation 
of the subordinate roles as well as the senior roles in the 
same or different time duration. A session-specific 
activation-time hierarchy 𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 performs inn 
highly restrictive manner of 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆, in which the 
simultaneous activation is permitted for both the senior 
and subordinate roles in the similar or same session. It 
should be noticed that 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ,  𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 , and  𝐴𝐴𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 −
ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆posses the mutually inclusive semantics 
where they permit the subordinate role for being 
activated only in the case when the senior is in the active 
state. 
The exclusive activation-time hierarchy ( 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 −
ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆), presents a mutually exclusive semantics for 
a hierarchy relation. The three conditions employed for  𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 states that the singular hierarchically 
associated roles might be activated simultaneously. 
Additionally, when a role is activated the permissions of 
its juniors are not inherited. The 
𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 extends 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 with a 
supplementary condition that if a role is activated, 
permissions that can be acquired through its junior are 
also acquired. In a given set of roles, various inheritance 
relations may exist. Hence, in order to assure that the 
senior-subordinate relation between two roles which 
exist in one kind of hierarchy is not turned around in 
another. 
i. Time-Based Separation of Duty Constraints 
The DEERBAC models permit the static as well 
as dynamic 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 constraints(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷). In this 
model we have bind a 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷constraint which has to be 
implemented in a certain set of intervals by employing 
periodicity constraints of the form(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷). In the 
same way, a duration constraint might be specified for 
an𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 as([𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵|𝑇𝑇 , ]𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒 , 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷). Then while, various 
semantic interpretations of the constraint (A, B, SOD) or ([A, B|T , ]𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒 , SOD)might exist. Prior to presenting this 
kinds of interpretations of a periodicity 
constraint(A, B, SOD), initially we have observed that for 
single interval, say π, the constraint expression π, SOD 
can be interpreted in two ways, as defined for weak and 
strong forms of time-based SSOD .  
The strong form 𝜋𝜋, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠states that in a defined 
specific time interval, if there exist an instant in which a 
roleℛ, is allotted to certain user, then at no other instant 
in 𝜋𝜋 can the user be allotted to a role that might cause 
the confliction with role 𝑠𝑠. Employing these two forms, 
here in 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 model we have obtained three 
semantic interpretations of periodicity 
constraint(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷).  the weak form (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁  )states that at each time instant in(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵), 
a user must not be allotted to conflicting roles. (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁 ), then also, permits a user to be allotted 
to two conflicting roles at different time durations. The 
strong form (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 )states that for individual 
recurring intervals in(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵), the strong form of interval 
constraint �𝜋𝜋, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 �is implemented. The extended 
strong form �𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 _𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 �implies that there are 
no two or more time instants in (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) for which a user 
can be assigned roles with certain conflicts.  
ii. Security of DEERBAC model with Temporal 
Hierarchies and SoD Constraints  
In spite of 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 constraints and temporal 
hierarchies it needs the extension of the objective of 
blocked events and TCAB safety as these approaches 
introduces new scenarios in which certain events might 
be blocked or certain insecure scenario might occur in 
cloud environment. Specifically, in order to implement 
specified 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 constraints, few events are required to be 
blocked. In certain work the researchers Ahn et al [18] 
presented that both S𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 constraints could 
be presented as cardinality constraints with respect to 
certain specific or provided user and role sets. Thus, by 
implementing such kind of condition which is allied with 
the activation cardinality constraint, the events added to (𝑝𝑝,𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍,𝑋𝑋𝐷𝐷, 𝛾𝛾,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) can be expressed in the presence of 
the𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 constraints.  
It can be noted that only the addition of Awsc − hierarchy  is required to be estimated with 
respect to the security ofγ. As for illustration, in the 
presented 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑁𝑁 algorithm we are capable of 
detecting the unsafe situations like the presence of the 
pair of trigger (EN_g → 𝑃𝑃_𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝑍𝑍;   𝑃𝑃_𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝑍𝑍 →
𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠_𝑔𝑔 in 𝛾𝛾. However, �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚 → 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝑍𝑍;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝑍𝑍 →
𝑤𝑤:𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚}is considered secure by application 
of 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑁𝑁 algorithm. This is possible because the 
events in triggers are of dissimilar kinds which don’t 
cause any conflict. However, if we add Awwc − hierarchy 
between roles g andq, i.e., if 
γ = {𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝑎𝑎 → 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 :𝑍𝑍; 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶ Z → 𝑠𝑠:𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝐴𝐴 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚, (𝑔𝑔 ≽𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ,𝑝𝑝 𝐴𝐴)}, 
Then in that caseγ becomes unsafe. In order to 
illustrate this point, suppose that initially 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝) = {𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚, } 
As the events are not blocked, the pair of triggers in 
γgenerates 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝) = {𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝐴𝐴 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚, 
𝑤𝑤:𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝑍𝑍. 
Note, event “𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝐴𝐴 for 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚” is now blocked by the 
event “𝑤𝑤:𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝐴𝐴 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚, ” resulting in 
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎�𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍(𝑝𝑝)� = {𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Security Provisioning in Cloud Environments Using Dynamic Expiration Enabled Role Based Access 
Control Model
𝑤𝑤:𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚,𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 ∶ 𝑍𝑍} 
As 𝐴𝐴wsc − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆 needs that both the roles 
𝑔𝑔 and 𝐴𝐴 is in the active state simultaneously during a 
session, then the hierarchy constraint would block the 
event “𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚”. Therefore, event “𝑤𝑤:𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝑔𝑔 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚” causes event“𝑤𝑤:𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚” 
that further blocks the previous events. It must be noted 
that the conflicting scenarios are introduced because 
the𝐴𝐴wsc − ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑆𝑆, additionally defines a session-
based constraint in spite of the role-activation 
semantics. Except for the𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ,𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒, 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 −
ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠, the other hierarchies define only the 
permission-inheritance and role-activation semantics 
and, therefore they do not cause such kinds of 
conflicting scenarios.  
The ascending section presents the results and 
conclusion obtained for the proposed system model. 
VII. Results 
In this research work a dynamic expiration 
enabled role based access control “DEERBAC” model 
has been developed for highly competitive and secured 
cloud computing environment. The system model 
presented has been developed with C# programs and 
Visual Basic 2010 framework. The overall system has 
been developed and implemented with Amazon S3 
cloud platform. The developed system has been 
simulated for different performance parameters like 
induction of roles and user creation. The relative study 
for these all factors has been performed. The system or 
model performance has been verified for various user 
size with dynamic role assignments and the relative 
throughout as well as performance parameters have 
been checked for its robustness justification.  
 
Figure 3 : User initialization with 10 role assignments 
The above mentioned figure (Figure 3) depicts 
the initialization of users for 10 respective role 
assignments and here from the figure it is clear that the 
role assignments can be better as per the number of 
increased users. Referring to Figure 4 and comparing it 
with previous figure it can be found that with higher 
users the time for user creation varies linearly but there 
occurs certain variation in user creation time with 
increase in assignment of role. The creation time 
decreases as per increase in higher count of cloud 
users.  
 
Figure 4 : User initialization with 30 role assignments 
Figure 5 depicts the user initialization with 100 
roles and from figure it can be concluded that in case of 
proposed DEERBAC model the user creation time 
decreases with increase in the cloud user count and in 
the same proportion the role assignment time also 
decreases as per higher counts of cloud users. This 
illustrates the robustness of our proposed DEERBAC 
system for cloud environment.  
 
Figure 5 : User initialization with 100 role assignments 
 
Figure 6 : User initialization with 200 role assignments 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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The above mentioned figure (Figure 6) depicts 
the initialization of users with respective 200 role 
initialization. The dominant factors that is coming out of 
the presented results is that the proposed system is 
capable of assigning roles even with higher count in 
least possible and of course uniform way. This justifies 
the stability of the proposed system with higher number 
of users in cloud environment and with more role 
assignments. Figure 8 presents the graphs for role 
generation with varying user counts and the respective 
time variation for role generation.  
 
Figure 7 : User initialization with 250 role assignments 
 
Figure
 
8
 
:
 
Role generation performance evaluation in 
DEERBAC model
 
VIII.
 
Results
 
In this work the author has proposed a dynamic 
expiration enabled role based access control 
(DEERBAC) system which permits the characterization 
of a widespread set of temporal constraints. Specifically 
for role enabling and its activation and numerous 
temporal restrictions functional for on user-role and role-
permission assignments. In this DEERBAC model we 
have also discussed the various time-based semantics 
of temporal hierarchies and separation of duty 
constraints or SoD constraints. An objective of security 
has been considered in the form of a highly secured 
execution model that functions overall DEERBAC model 
for accomplishing security in cloud or for security 
management. The constraints for duration
 
along the 
work in reference [17] might be assumed as 
dependency constraints in which the temporal intervals 
allied with a role remains dependent on the time 
intervals allied with some other roles. The proposed 
DEERBAC model additionally introduces the extensions 
to the various semantics of the temporal or another 
constraint. The implementation of various hierarchical 
constraints and separation of duty constraints for real 
time implementation makes this system highly efficient 
for real time implementation with higher user count and 
competitive cloud environment. The results also have 
established that the proposed model can be an effective 
and optimum approach for role based access control in 
cloud environment. 
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